In late August, President Donald J. Trump announced that up to 600,000 Chinese students would be allowed to study in the United States. He stated that without the revenue from full tuition and fees from international students, financially vulnerable schools could collapse:
"I like that their students come here, I like that other countries' students come here. And you know what would happen if they didn't, our system would go to hell immediately. And it wouldn't be the top colleges, it would be colleges that struggle on the bottom."
This policy, however, has drawn criticism across the political spectrum, even from supporters of MAGA. They argue that it prioritizes tuition dollars over national security.
American universities face a delicate balancing act. Foreign student tuition is undeniably lucrative, but it comes with strategic risks. With the average annual tuition including room and board ranging between $80,000-$100,000. U.S. institutions currently earn approximately $50.2 billion in tuition from international students annually. More than 50 percent of these international students come from just two countries: India and China.
Among these, Chinese students represent a significant proportion, with many paying full or near-full tuition for their U.S. education. There are more than 6.3 million people in China who reportedly have a net worth of more than a million dollars. Since most of these students are self-funded, and as international students are generally ineligible for state tuition or domestic scholarships, these students bear the full financial burden themselves. As a result, the vast majority of Chinese students independently fund their studies in the U.S.
There are 277,398 students from China currently studying in U.S. higher education institutions, often elite ones. For Chinese families, an Ivy League or top-tier U.S. degree is more than just an academic credential; it is a prestigious status symbol and a key indicator of success. Graduating from a world-renowned university carries significant career advantages, not only within China but also globally, enhancing job prospects and social standing. This perception of value drives a steady flow of Chinese students willing to invest heavily in education abroad.
China recognizes the strategic value of these students. As American universities and laboratories are global leaders in advanced research, Beijing has developed a multifaceted strategy to acquire that knowledge. One element is the China Scholarship Council (CSC), which funds Chinese citizens to study in the United States, particularly in STEM fields (science, technology, engineering and mathematics) on the condition that they return home to serve China's scientific and technological ambitions.
Complementing this is the Thousand Talents Plan, which offers lucrative salaries, research funding, housing benefits, and prestigious positions to overseas-trained students and researchers, incentivizing them to bring back advanced skills, technological expertise, and sensitive intellectual property. Intelligence officials also apparently see these initiatives as an encouragement of espionage.
Espionage is an activity additionally concerning, as well as the role China's intelligence agencies play in recruiting ordinary citizens for it. Bin Wu, a philosophy professor who relocated to the U.S., was reportedly approached by Chinese operatives offering substantial financial incentives in exchange for sensitive technology, including sensitive night-vision technology. According to reports, the Ministry of State Security (MSS) and the Military Intelligence Department (MID) threatened Mr. Wu with serious prison time if he refused to cooperate. Wu ultimately established front companies in Virginia to purchase and export the sought-after technology to China. This mode of operation underscores the extent to which Chinese intelligence agencies will go to acquire critical technological assets.
Similarly, Dongfan "Greg" Chung, an aeronautical engineer at Boeing, transmitted hundreds of thousands of pages of sensitive aerospace and military data to China over a 30-year career, assisted by another spy, Chi Mak. Wang Xin, a researcher at UCSF, was arrested at Los Angeles International Airport and charged with visa fraud after lying about his PLA affiliation. He had claimed on his visa application that he had left the People's Liberation Army in 2016, but U.S. Customs and Border Protection later discovered that he was still employed as a "Level‑9 technician," a military rank roughly equivalent to major, and that he was also receiving compensation from the China Scholarship Council. Court documents allege that Wang was instructed by superiors to observe the layout of the UCSF lab with the intent to replicate it in China, and that he attempted to transfer scientific studies via email and physically carry them back to PLA‑linked labs.
These cases reveal a consistent strategy: the MSS and MID target individuals with access to dual-use or strategically important technologies, offering financial or professional incentives, and by exploiting personal vulnerabilities to coerce participation in espionage. Those reluctant to comply can be reminded that their families back home may be at risk. With at least six known CCP-linked illegal police stations still operating across the U.S., additional channels of coercion likely remain, including pressure applied through Chinese 'educators' and 'diplomats.'
While espionage concerns are real, a recent interview with the author—conducted with Suisheng Zhao, a leading China scholar, highlights the strategic advantage of having Chinese students in the U.S. He emphasized that Beijing frequently seeks to shape narratives abroad through state propaganda--portraying the U.S. as politically unstable and its system as inferior, pointing to events, such as the 2008 financial crisis, the mishandling of the COVID-19 pandemic, which originated in China and the so-called January 6 insurrection. In reality, Chinese students living and learning in America will experience freedom, meritocracy, and world-class education firsthand. This exposure allows them to compare systems directly, recognize the strengths of the U.S., and potentially influence change upon returning to China, making their presence in American universities strategically significant beyond academics.
However, this view overlooks the real national security risks posed by some foreign students. Second-tier universities may be tempted to rely on international tuition for financial survival, but money cannot replace excellence. It must do a better job at recruiting American students. To stay competitive, these schools must attract world-class scholars, build cutting-edge labs, and provide education that earns students' respect on merit—not price. Tuition alone cannot train the next generation of leaders who will guide America through the challenges of the 21st century.
To address these risks, many policymakers argue that national security and academic integrity can be safeguarded if international students are properly vetted for ties to the CCP or military, and if STEM graduates entering sensitive industries undergo rigorous background checks. However, this perspective ignores China's broader objective in sending students to American schools: ultimately to surpass and displace the U.S. as the world's leading superpower. It also downplays or deliberately overlooks the significant threat posed by CCP operatives in the U.S. seeking to co-opt students, whose presence is both intentional and central to their mission.
If the applicants were from a reliable ally, the situation might be different. However, China has already declared a "people's war" on the U.S. through the doctrine of "Unrestricted Warfare," first outlined in a 1999 publication by two PLA colonels. Although Trump has expressed hopes of turning the CCP into a partner, that goal has not been realized, and under the current Xi regime, meaningful cooperation remains highly unlikely. So why would the U.S. consider it an "honor" to admit 600,000 students who may seek to help China to achieve its ambition of becoming the dominant global power in the 21st century?
A more prudent approach would be for the US government to provide universities with grants equivalent to the tuition from these students and reserve those slots for American students. Why are we educating potential competitors, let alone enemies?
Maintaining U.S. technological and strategic leadership requires constant vigilance. The very institutions driving cutting-edge research and shaping the innovators of tomorrow also have the potential to serve the interests of global rivals, such as China, if left unchecked. Universities might understand that they are not operating in a vacuum; they are at the heart of a global competition where intellectual property, advanced research, and talent are critical assets. Protecting these assets means implementing robust safeguards, carefully scrutinizing foreign influence, and ensuring that the drive for tuition revenue never compromises national security. The future of America, as well as the West, depends on it.
Derek Levine is a full-time professor at Monroe University, and the author of "The Dragon Takes Flight: China's Aviation Policy, Achievements and Implications for the United States and Europe" and "China's Path to Dominance: Preparing for Confrontation with the U.S.". He can be reached at dlevine@monroeu.edu
