US President Donald J. Trump's proposed civilian nuclear agreement with Saudi Arabia risks becoming one of the most dangerous strategic mistakes in recent American Middle East policy. Although supporters portray the agreement as a peaceful energy partnership designed to strengthen relations with a key Arab ally, the long-term consequences could be devastating. The agreement threatens to weaken decades of US non-proliferation policy, ignite a regional arms race, embolden America's adversaries, and create security risks that future generations may be powerless to reverse.
Congress and the American public should reject the agreement before it sets a precedent that could undermine global efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.
The most controversial aspect of the proposed agreement is that it reportedly allows Saudi Arabia to develop domestic uranium enrichment capabilities under safeguards that fall short of the stringent standards previously demanded by Washington. While low-enriched uranium is used to fuel civilian nuclear reactors, the same technology can eventually produce highly enriched uranium suitable for nuclear weapons.
The danger is not theoretical.
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman made his intentions unmistakably clear several years ago. "Saudi Arabia does not want to acquire any nuclear bomb," he said in 2018. "But without a doubt, if Iran developed a nuclear bomb, we will follow suit as soon as possible."
These words should have ended any discussion about permitting uranium enrichment on Saudi soil. They reveal that Riyadh views civilian nuclear capabilities not merely as an energy project but also as a potential strategic hedge against Iran.
Supporters of the agreement argue that the kingdom remains a close American partner and that the deal contains sufficient safeguards. History, however, teaches a different lesson: governments change, regimes fall, alliances split, and today's friend -- even as a member of the Abraham Accords -- may not be tomorrow's ally.
Saudi Arabia has experienced repeated terrorist attacks by al-Qaeda and ISIS. It is also the birthplace of Osama bin Laden, and 15 of the 19 terrorists who carried out the September 11, 2001 attacks were Saudi citizens. Although the Saudi government has consistently denied any involvement in those attacks, the kingdom's history suggests otherwise.
The persistent threat posed by Islamist extremism still exists.
Between 2003 and 2006, al-Qaeda launched a deadly insurgency inside the kingdom, targeting government institutions, foreign residents, and critical infrastructure. ISIS has claimed responsibility for attacks on mosques, security forces, and civilians inside Saudi Arabia.
Although Saudi authorities have largely succeeded in suppressing these groups, their existence underscores an enduring reality: extremist Islamist organizations continue to view the kingdom as both a battlefield and a prize. No one can predict Saudi Arabia's political landscape 20 or 30 years from now. A future period of instability, succession crisis, or regime collapse could deliver sensitive nuclear facilities, technology, or materials to actors whose goals are fundamentally hostile to the United States and its allies.
The greatest danger, therefore, is not Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman or the current Saudi leadership. The greatest danger is the uncertainty surrounding whoever may rule the kingdom decades from now. Nuclear technology lasts far longer than political regimes.
No American president can guarantee that the House of Saud will rule forever. Political upheaval, internal instability, or even a violent overthrow of the monarchy could one day place uranium enrichment facilities, nuclear scientists, sensitive technologies, and weapons-grade materials into the hands of Islamist terrorists.
Once sensitive nuclear technology escapes state control, it cannot simply be recovered. Terrorist organizations could exploit nuclear expertise or materials themselves or sell them on the global black market to rogue regimes or other non-state actors. Such a scenario would represent an irreversible nightmare for international counterterrorism and non-proliferation efforts.
The proposed agreement also abandons the "gold standard" that has guided US civilian nuclear cooperation for decades. Under the 2009 US-United Arab Emirates (UAE) nuclear agreement, Abu Dhabi accepted strict conditions that prohibited domestic uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing while granting comprehensive international oversight. These restrictions significantly reduced proliferation dangers.
The Saudi agreement reportedly discards many of these safeguards. It also reportedly does not require Riyadh to adopt the International Atomic Energy Agency's Additional Protocol, which allows inspectors short-notice access to undeclared facilities to detect clandestine nuclear activities.
If Washington lowers its own standards for Saudi Arabia, other countries will inevitably demand identical treatment.
The UAE would likely seek to renegotiate its own agreement. Turkey and Egypt would almost certainly demand similar privileges. Russia and China could use the American precedent to justify weaker safeguards in their own nuclear partnerships across the Middle East and beyond.
Instead of strengthening the global non-proliferation regime, the United States would be weakening it with its own hands.
The agreement also undermines Washington's ability to confront Iran over its nuclear ambitions. For years, successive American administrations have insisted that Iran must never be allowed to enrich uranium without stringent international oversight because enrichment provides a pathway to nuclear weapons. If Saudi Arabia is granted that same capability under less demanding conditions, Tehran will immediately accuse Washington of double standards.
Indeed, Iranian officials have already begun making precisely that argument. Iranian Interior Ministry spokesman Ali Zeinivand recently declared that if a regional arms race begins, Iran would have "more freedom of action than anyone else," while accusing the United States of discrimination by permitting some countries to pursue nuclear capabilities while denying others the same right.
The United States cannot credibly demand that Iran abandon capabilities it is simultaneously willing to grant Saudi Arabia.
The agreement also threatens to trigger a dangerous regional nuclear arms race. Iran has repeatedly indicated that it would respond to Saudi nuclear advances. Turkey has already warned that it may be forced to pursue similar capabilities if Iran acquires nuclear weapons. Egypt would undoubtedly come under pressure to do the same.
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the agreement is that it separates civilian nuclear cooperation from broader diplomatic objectives.
The Trump Administration views civilian nuclear assistance as leverage to advance normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel under the Abraham Accords.
Peace, however, should never be purchased through strategic concessions that jeopardize international security.
Peace with Israel is not a prize awarded by Arab or Muslim countries. It is not something that should require American bribes in the form of nuclear technology or strategic incentives.
Peace serves Saudi Arabia's own interests. It enhances regional stability, strengthens economic development, attracts foreign investment, and improves security for all parties. Arab and Muslim states should pursue peace with Israel because it benefits their own people -- not because Washington offers dangerous concessions.
Once uranium enrichment spreads across the Middle East, it cannot easily be contained. Once regional powers begin competing for nuclear capabilities, there may be no turning back. The United States should not become the architect of the next Middle East nuclear arms race.
Khaled Abu Toameh is an award-winning journalist based in Jerusalem.
