The Iranian regime has always sought nuclear weapons, but at the moment, this ambition may have taken on an unprecedented urgency. For decades, the ruling clerics have perceived nuclear capability as a symbol of power and ideological triumph. Now, more than ever before, the regime may be prepared to use every trick, tactic, and deception it has cultivated over the years to achieve that goal. Iran's leaders appear to see nuclear weapons not simply as a strategic tool, but as an existential necessity — a shield for the regime's survival and a sword to advance its revolutionary ideology.
One of the core reasons Iran has reportedly been ratcheting up its pursuit of nuclear weapons again might be the shock it experienced during the recent 12-day war. The conflict exposed, in a brutally clear manner, how deeply inferior Iran's military capabilities are compared to Israel and the United States, especially its air force and advanced warfare infrastructure. Iran watched its proxy forces struggle and realized that in a direct confrontation, it lacks the conventional military strength either to deter or defeat its adversaries. This realization may well have intensified the regime's belief that a nuclear weapon is "the great equalizer."
Iran's leadership sees that one nuclear-armed missile aimed at Israel could accomplish what decades of proxy warfare, rhetoric, and regional maneuvering have failed to do. A nuclear weapon, in their ideological worldview, offers the possibility of wiping out Israel, fulfilling what they see as a historic, strategic, and religious prophecy. This belief is embedded in the regime's revolutionary narrative, and the recent military vulnerabilities may well have made the pursuit of nuclear arms feel both urgent and inevitable to Tehran's elite.
Iran currently faces a convergence of internal and external pressures that most likely make the regime feel cornered. Externally, renewed sanctions — particularly under Washington's tougher policies — have squeezed Iran's economy. Regionally, Iran finds itself more isolated now that the Assad regime in Syria collapsed, weakening the backbone of Tehran's influence corridor stretching from Iran through Iraq and Syria to Lebanon. With Assad's departure, Iran's regional leverage suffered a severe blow: its power projection capabilities have been disrupted.
Internally, for the regime, the situation must seem even more alarming. Domestic dissatisfaction is widespread, driven by unemployment, inflation, and the deteriorating quality of life for ordinary Iranians. The country faces a worsening water crisis that threatens agriculture, industry, and social stability. Such conditions create fertile ground for mass protests and uprisings — something the regime has repeatedly struggled to contain. In the minds of Iran's rulers, a nuclear weapon is doubtless the ultimate insurance policy. They believe it can secure the regime's longevity by projecting an image of strength similar to North Korea's strategy: a nuclear-armed dictatorship that cannot be toppled from within or pressured from abroad. In their thinking, nuclear weapons elevate them to invulnerability.
Some Western politicians and policymakers argue that negotiations remain the best path forward. Negotiations, however, which provide stretchable time, have historically empowered and emboldened the Iranian regime rather than restrained it. A diplomatic agreement that does not require dismantling Iran's nuclear infrastructure — fully, permanently, and verifiably — would only give the regime the opportunity to race to a nuclear weapons breakout, legitimacy, and room to maneuver. Iran has repeatedly used talks as a tactical pause, a chance to ease sanctions, gain financial relief, and reconstitute its nuclear capabilities behind closed doors. A flawed or partial agreement would allow Iran to continue enriching uranium, advance in missile technology, and expand its scientific base under the protection of international diplomacy. Far from slowing down Iran's nuclear ambitions, weak negotiations risk institutionalizing them.
The regime must be confronted with a clear choice. Either Tehran cooperates fully and dismantles its nuclear weapons program once and for all, or it must face escalating consequences. These consequences must be meaningful — stronger economic sanctions, greater diplomatic isolation, and, if necessary, credible military pressure. Equally important, the West needs to increase its support for the Iranian people rather than for the regime. Supporting dissidents and amplifying the voices of Iranians who seek democratic change can weaken the regime's grip and challenge its belief that nuclear weapons guarantee eternal survival. The longer the West waits, the more entrenched the regime becomes.
The Iranian regime clearly wants nuclear weapons – desperately – driven by strategic weakness, ideological ambition and fear for its own survival. The West must not give Iran the time or space it needs to complete its mission. The free world's objective must be to dismantle Iran's nuclear program completely, preserve no loopholes, and maintain pressure until Tehran's path to nuclear armament is permanently blocked. Anything less risks empowering a regime that seeks both regional dominance and ideological Islamist conquest under the secure shield of nuclear weapons.
Dr. Majid Rafizadeh, is a political scientist, Harvard-educated analyst, and board member of Harvard International Review. He has authored several books on the US foreign policy. He can be reached at dr.rafizadeh@post.harvard.edu
