Iranian leaders have emerged from their latest contacts with the Trump administration sounding upbeat, even enthusiastic. Senior officials have described the talks as a "good start," constructive engagement, and delight at the prospect of continuing negotiations. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi's tone has been deliberately reassuring, projecting calm confidence and a sense that diplomacy is moving in the perfect direction.
From the Iranian regime's perspective, any talks are preferable to sanctions, sustained military pressure, the threat of escalation, and the prospect that US President Donald J. Trump might choose confrontation over an agreement.
Trump, for his part, has repeatedly emphasized that he prefers a deal, but that "all options" remain on the table.
Iranian leaders understand this language very well. They know that the Trump administration is willing to use force, impose maximum pressure, and act unilaterally if it believes diplomacy is being abused or exhausted. Faced with this reality, Tehran has every incentive to appear cooperative, compliant and eager to continue discussions, even if it has no intention of making the slightest concession.
Iran's strategy is clear. The regime does not necessarily see negotiations as a path to resolution; it sees them as a tool for delay. The most valuable currency is time. Every additional round of talks, every agreement to meet again, every statement about "progress" or "positive momentum" buys the regime more breathing space. Its central objective is not to reach an agreement with Trump, but to stretch the process long enough to outlast his term of office. If Iran can drag negotiations across months and years, it no doubt hopes to reach a moment when U.S. pressure weakens, priorities shift, or its leadership changes. In that sense, diplomacy becomes a defensive weapon, an end in itself.
Iran's is not a new government improvising on the world stage. It is the same Islamic Republic that has been negotiating with foreign powers for more than four decades. The individual representatives may change, but the method does not. The regime has negotiated with Democrats and Republicans, with hawks and doves, with allies and adversaries. Iran's regime has refined its tactics, learned its opponents' weaknesses, and mastered the art of procedural diplomacy: how to slow talks without collapsing them, how to offer symbolic concessions while protecting core interests, and how to appear reasonable while remaining fundamentally intransigent.
For the mullahs, President Barack Obama's 2015 "nuclear deal" was a triumph. Under intense international pressure, Iran entered negotiations. Sanctions were immediately lifted, billions of dollars were released, and Iran was reintegrated into the global economy. Obama's illegitimate Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), rather than permanently dismantling Iran's nuclear capabilities, enshrined them. The deal conveniently contained sunset clauses with expiration dates, so that restrictions on Iran's nuclear program would magically vanish – poof! -- four months ago, on October 18, 2025, in fact.
From Iran's perspective, this was not only an economic and diplomatic windfall; it was a validation of its long-term strategy. By holding firm, negotiating patiently, and exploiting the political timelines in Washington and the US voters' distaste for war, the Iranian regime extracted maximum benefits while preserving its future options.
This history undoubtedly shapes how Iran views the current moment. The regime seems to believe, with total justification, that negotiating, when it is used strategically, works. It sees talks as a method, when direct confrontation might be too costly, as a method not just of survival but of advancement. If Iran possessed overwhelming military power, and were not constrained by sanctions, internal unrest, and external pressure, it would not be sitting at the negotiating table. It would be openly projecting force, just as it has done for nearly half a century and as, across the region, it encourages its proxies to do.
Iran, however, does appear to appreciate that, for the moment at least, it cannot win a direct military confrontation with the United States, especially under a president who has not demonstrated a helpful fear of escalation.
At the same time, despite the regime's defiant rhetoric, it doubtless understands that it is under enormous strain. Economically, sanctions have hollowed out growth and opportunity. Politically, legitimacy has eroded. Waves of protests -- despite the murder of tens of thousands of protesters, blinding thousands of others, and the long prison terms that the regime has inflicted on its citizens -- continue to challenge the system from within.
Socially, anger and despair have spread among an oppressed population. The regime survives not because it is strong, but because it is patient, adaptive and ruthless. Diplomatic negotiations, at such a moment, reduce the immediate pressure of external threats and allow Iran's military to regroup, reinforce its internal security apparatus, and repress its citizens with even greater brutality.
Every day that talks continue without decisive pressure is a day the regime can use to strengthen its rule. It can import and build more deadly weapons, refine its ballistic missiles, reinforce its regional proxy militias, and tighten its grip internally.
Time overwhelmingly favors the Iranian regime. Even just the act of sitting across the negotiating table, for Iranian officials, signifies recognition and endurance.
For ordinary, unarmed Iranians, however, who have suffered the regime's savagery - its mass murder, blindings, rapes, mass arrests, and deadly crackdowns, seeing their rulers treated as legitimate diplomatic interlocutors has to be unbearably demoralizing. It sends the message that the countries of the West are willing to engage with those who oppress them, and -- as long as the comfort of foreigners is at stake -- actually leave their tormentors in place.
Beyond immediate tactics, Iran's approach must be understood as part of a much larger messianic project. This is a regime that sees itself as engaged in a major religious-historical mission. Its leaders believe they are guardians of a revolutionary system with religious and ideological foundations that transcend generations, uprisings and even the visage of Trump. From this perspective, waiting out another three years is not difficult; it is expected. American administrations come and go. Pressure rises and falls. What matters is resilience, maintaining the course. The regime is willing to absorb blows, retreat temporarily, and compromise tactically if, in doing so, it believes its long-term survival is secured.
Each time the regime regains strength, it emerges more hardened, more aggressive, and more confident that its methods work. The regime uses negotiations to reset the board and prepare for the next phase of confrontation — whether military, political or diplomatic.
The central danger is that the longer negotiation process drags on that rewards delay, and that prioritizes short-term stability over long-term accountability, the greater the risk of consolidating the very system that the process claims to moderate. Every additional day Iran buys through talks is another day the regime survives, adapts, prepares for war.
Iran's current enthusiasm for negotiations is not evidence of transformation or moderation. It is merely evidence of calculation. The regime is waiting for pressure to fade and opportunities to resurrect. Iran's regime, by now a master of this game, plays it patiently, relentlessly, and without illusion. If the Trump administration's goal is to prevent the Iranian regime from emerging more brutal and more entrenched, the greatest mistake would be to give it what it really wants: time to wait out Trump.
Dr. Majid Rafizadeh, is a political scientist, Harvard-educated analyst, and board member of Harvard International Review. He has authored several books on the US foreign policy. He can be reached at dr.rafizadeh@post.harvard.edu
